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TAXATION OF INCOME TO AUTHORS
GwOwG H. FiSCmZR*
I. INTRODUCTION.
In recent years the author has consistently been confronted with
the perplexity of his tax problems, ranging from the proper treat-
ment to be accorded the proceeds of an occasional sale of his pro-
duct to the question of whether an undertaking he had intended to
be nothing more than a mere hobby has suddenly become his trade or
business. The principal cause underlying this predicament is apparent
once.it is understood that the author's product is generally excluded
from the definition of a capital asset, while the casual "investor" con-
tinues to report his gains at the benevolent rate of 25%.1 The argu-
ment which is advanced- in support of this differential between the
tax treatment of similar property in the hands of persons with
dissimilar interests is that the capital gain is earned over a period
of years and converted into income in a single year, and that it
would be outrageously unfair to tax this gain as ordinary income
since the result would be to create an abnormally high tax bracket.2
The proponents of the more lenient form of taxation are quick to
expound upon the necessitie for allowing property which has ap-
preciated over a period of years to be disposed of without the threat
of confiscatory rates which would virtually nullify the monetary
advantages of the disposition. However, an exploration of this
thesis reveals that only certain types of appreciated property are
deemed entitled to these tax advantages, while others, such as copy-
righted and other forms of literary property, which may be pro-
ducts of more extensive time and diligence, are cunningly excluded.
The causes for this seemingly unjustified situation, along with the
opportunities for and obstacles to legitimate tax avoidance, com-
prise the scope of the first half of this discussion.
The recent trials and tribulations of P. G. Wodehouse, a non-
resident alien author not engaged in trade or business in the United
OL.L.B. University of South Carolina (1949). L.L.M. Duke University (1950).
1. Only 50 per cent of a long-term capital gain is included in taxable in-
come, INT. R . CODE § 117 (b), and the maximum tax on capital gains is
limited to 25 per cent of the gain. Id. § 117 (c).
2. For an able and interesting critique of capital gains and losses, see
Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under the Federal In-
come Tax, 26 TEX. L. Rxv. 440 C1948).
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States, point up the tax problems which are inherent in any case
where the foreign author has marketed his wares within this country.
His primary concern is not that of capital gains since the non-
resident alien is exempt from the provisions of Section 117,3 but
it is the question of whether he is liable for any taxation or escapes
this liability altogether. A considerable part of the material appli-
cable to the discussion of resident authors is also pertinent when
dealing with the nonresident authors and consequently there will
be, of necessity, some overlapping in the treatment of these two
subjects. It is felt, however, that there is enough of a distinction
to justify a separate discussion of the two; thus, the second half
of this paper is devoted to a coverage of the tax effects resulting
from the disposition of the works of a nonresident alien author
within the United States.
II. RnSIDENT AUTHORS.
1. Capital Gains
In order for the disposition of a copyright or any interest therein
to result in a capital gain there must be two factors present in the
transaction: First, the copyright must have qualified under the
definition of a capital asset, and second, it must have been either
sold or exchanged rather than merely licensed.4 In the absence
of either of these qualifications the profits from the disposition will
be taxed as ordinary gain at the regular rates applicable to wages
from employment.
The case of Goldsmith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue5
brings into bold relief the problems inherent in any situation where
the originator of literary property has parted with an interest there-
in for gain. The petitioner therein had written one play upon
which he received a statutory copyright from the United States.
Subsequently, he assigned the exclusive motion picture rights in
the play to Paramount Pictures, Inc., and each year thereafter re-
ported the payments made for such assignment as capital gains re-
sulting from the sale of a capital asset. The Commissioner denied
the fact that the payments were capital gains and assessed a de-
ficiency for each of the years in which they had been reported as
such. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner on two grounds,
3. By experience it has been found administratively impossible to collect in-
come taxes on capital gains realized by nonresident aliens. See SED. RV.
No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. 21 (1936); Angell, The Nonresident Alien:
A Problem it; Federal Taxation of Income, 36 COL. L. REv. 908 (1936).
4. IN. REV. CODe § 117.
5. 143 F. 2d 466 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
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viz., that the amounts received were actually royalties and even if
they were paid for the sale of property the motion picture rights
did not qualify as capital assets as that term is defined in Section
117 (a) (1).6
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's holding but it is interesting to note the two separate
concurring opinions by Judge Chase and Judge Learned Hand, each
denying the petitioner the privilege of reporting his profit as capital
gains but on entirely different bases.
Judge Chase viewed the case from the standpoint of copyright
law and its effect on whether a copyright could be so divided that
the owner could assign one or more of the separable rights which
together make the copyright property. He stated that there was
no restriction against treating the several rights as separate entities
and conveying them to someone else,7 but that such rights did not
make the assignee the owner thereof and that he acquired only the
lesser rights granted by the terms of the assignment.8 What he ac-
tually gets, according to Judge Chase, are the rights of a licensee, 9
and being in the position of a licensee he has no title to the pro-
perty and consequently no sale has been made.10
If the view of Judge Chase is to be adhered to it naturally follows
as a conclusion that there need be no further inquiry as to whether
the property transferred was a capital asset. Section 117 sets forth
as a prime requisite that in order for the transaction to result in a
capital gain the property must have been disposed of by means of
a "sale or exchange".
Judge Hand disregarded any mention of the nature of the dis-
position other than to state that he could not see wherein it was at
all necessary to the result in the case since they had the word of
the petitioner that he was engaged in the business of a playright and
that the property sold by him was of the type that was used in the
6. "The term 'capital asset' means property held by the taxpayer (whether
or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include stock in
trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be in-
cluded in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable
year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the or-
dinary course of his trade or business, or property, used in the trade or business,
of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in
§23 (1), .... "
7. Photo-Drama v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 30 F. Supp. 830 (C. C. A. 2d
1915).
8. Goldwyn Pictures v. Howells, 282 F. 9 (C. C. A. 2d 1922).
9. M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (E. D. S. C.
1924).
10. Sabatiui v. Commissioner, 98 F. 2d 753 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
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ordinary course of his business." This, in itself, would render the
capital gains sections inapplicable because of the exclusion of pro-
perty used in a "trade or business" from the definition of a "capital
asset". 12 He rejected the dogma of indivisibility:
An exclusive license requires that the author protect the li-
censee against other infringement, and is for most purposes
treated 'as property'. I think that it is 'property' within Section
117 (a) (1) ; that its grant is a 'sale';, . . It does not unduly
strain the meaning of 'sale' to make it include an exclusive
license.
Thus, it is apparent what the author faces when he attempts to
dispose of his literary property in such a manner as to be allowed
the more lenient form of taxation. If Judge Chase's view were
followed it would mean that the copyright holder could keep no
strings attached to his interest in the copyright whatsoever. He
would be compelled to either part with the entire interest or stand
in the position of a mere licensor. If Judge Learned Hand's view
were followed the professional author would be denied capital gains
irrespective of what method he employed to convey his interest, for
according to his line of reasoning the exploitation of literary property
for profit constitutes a "trade or business" and when the author
parts with his works, whether in their entirety or in part, he does
so in the ordinary course thereof.
At this point one may have concluded that there is slight need
for any further discussion of capital gains in relation to authors
and the sale of literary property since the restrictive qualifications
of those provisions render it impossible for the author to take ad-
vantage of them, but such is not the case. In the first place, it
is quite possible that a situation may arise where the copyright is
disposed of along with all its component parts once and for all.
Certainly this is not often done in actual practice because it is much
to the advantage of the proprietor to sell the individual rights sepa-
rately, thereby realizing a much greater overall profit. Nevertheless,
situations have arisen where the benefits of lower taxation have
prompted such action. 13 There is also the possibility that the author
of a single composition may not be found to have engaged in a
trade or business. Again, the party holding the property may not
be the author but perhaps an assignee or one who had received it
11. Mr. Goldsmith stated in his return that he was in the "business" of a
playright.
12. INT. Rmv. CODM, § 117 (a) (1).
13. n re Rider, 16 R. I. 271, 15 A. 72 (1882).
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by bequest or inheritance. At any rate it behooves us to explore
further the capital gains measures since a finding in favor of the
taxpayer will result in a substantial tax saving.
2. Sale or License
In order to better understand the reasoning behind the decision
rendered by Judge Chase in the Goldsmith case we must first under-
stand what is meant by the terms "sale" or "assignment" on the
one hand and "license" on the other.
A copyright is a right in literary property which is recognized
and sanctioned by positive law. It is a right granted by statute
which invests the author or originator with the exclusive privilege
of printing copies of his work and publishing and selling them.
14
Section one of the Copyright Act of the United States provides that
once the author has shown himself to be entitled to a copyright he
will, upon complying with the provisions of the statute, have not
only the right of publication and sale but numerous other rights as
well.15 The privileges granted by the statute are sometimes re-
ferred to as the author's "bundle of rights". It is with the disposi-
tion of these rights individually as opposed to a release of them as
a whole that we are here concerned.
An assignment of a copyright is a conveyance by an instrument
in writing which vests in the assignee the entire monopoly owned
by the assignor and embraced in the terms of the instrument of the
transfer, subject to the recording provisions of the copyright act.18
The assignee is the party who holds, by a valid assignment in writ-
ing, the whole interest in the copyright and possesses it in his own
right as owner.17 A license, on the other hand, is simply permission
granted by competent authority to do some act which would be
illegal were it done without such permission.' 8 It creates nothing
more than a contractual relationship between the parties.19 Where
the right granted is of such a limited character as not to be the legal
subject matter of an assignment but merely an agreement for the
publication of a copyrighted work it will ordinarily be construed as
a license and not an assignment.2 0 If the agreement binds the
parties, heirs, executors, assigns, administrators, and successors it has
14. 61 STAT. 652 (1947) ; 17 U. S. C. A. § 1.
15. Ibid.
16. In re Lynch's Estate, 151 Misc. 549, 272 N. Y. S. 79 (1934).
17. Moore v. Marsh, 74 U. S. 515 (1868).
18. BALI,, LAW OV COPYRIGHT AND LITtRARY PROPmRTY, p. 530 (1944).
19. New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
20. In re D. H. McBride, 132 F. 285 (S. D. N. Y. 1904).
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been held to be an assignment, 21 but a mere license to publish does not
have these attributes and cannot be construed as such.22
Most of the cases dealing with the problem of when there has
been an assignment, with its attendant right to sue for infringement,
have applied the doctrine of indivisibility of the copyright. It has
been used to show that when the transferee receives less than all
the rights provided for by Section One of the Copyright Act he
does not become an owner of the rights granted but a mere licensee,2 3
and entitled to less judicial aid than the true owner or his "assignee."
24
This rule was clearly illustrated and applied in the case of Witnark
v. Pastime Amusement Co. 25 The conclusion reached in the majori-
ty of cases is, that since the licensee gets less than the whole he can-
not be the true owner of what he does receive and that, therefore,
there has been no sale.
There is also the procedural technicality of compulsory joinder
which prevents the licensee from standing in the position of owner
with the right to sue for infringement which would vest him with
command of the property.26 A licensee whose license is less than
exclusive has no such interest as to make him either a necessary or
proper party to a bill filed to restrain the infringement of a copy-
right under which he is licensed.2 7 Where the license is exclusive,
however, the licensee is a proper party and he may call upon the
proprietor to forbid toleration of an infringement.28 As the person
to whom less than the sum total of all the rights in the copyright
has been transferred, he stands in the position of one having equitable
title but not legal title. Before he can call upon the courts to de-
fend his position against seeking to infringe upon his rights he
must go through the formality of joining the proprietor as a nominal
party plaintiff.2 9 This alone is evidence of the fact that there has
been no outright assignment in the sense that the term is used in the
copyright cases. The position of a licensee under a copyright is
similar to that of a licensee under a patent, in so far as his right
21. Manners v. Morosco, 258 F. 557 (C. C. A. 2d 1919).
22. New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
23. Id. See also, 13 C. J. 1048.
24. See generally, AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAcricE, pp. 788-803, 913-
924 (1936); 13 C. J. 1094-1096; 18 C. .. S. 83; BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
AND LITERARY PROPERTY, p. 46 (1944).
25. 298 Fed. 470, (E. D. S. C. 1924) aff'd. per curiant 2 F. 2d 1020 (C. C. A.
4th 1924).
26. This has been clearly recognized only in the majority opinion in Wode-
house v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 986, 989 (C. C. A. 4th 1948) rev'sd on other
grounds, 337 U. S. 369 (1948).
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to sue is concerned, and the case of Waterman v. Mackenzies o clear-
ly shows the inability of the latter in this respect.
The arguments in favor of the indivisibility doctrine are, however,
not entirely convincing and, as it was pointed out by Judge Hand,
the thought that a "sale" might include an exclusive license does
not unduly strain the meafling of the term. 31 The various rights
-which are enumerated in Section One of the Copyright Act are
"inherently and essentially different. They are, for the most part,
exercised or purchased by different persons,"132 and for different
purposes ranging from books, newspapers and magazine publish-
ing to production for the legitimate stage and the motion picture.33
Each of these rights has a distinct value of its own and is not neces-
sarily a part of any of the other rights.3 4 The copyright owner may
sell these rights either as a whole or piecemeal as he desires.3 5 This
view was asserted in the case of Photo Drana Motion Picture Co.,
Inc. v. Social Uplift Film Corporation,36 wherein the court held, that
since the amendment of the copyright statutes by Act,3 7 under which
a copyright on a drama proper and one on a moving picture play
may be separately secured, the owner of the dramatic and motion
picture rights in a copyright book may sell and assign the two sepa-
rately. It should also be noted that sometimes the several rights
of the copyright owner may be used as a basis for securing new
and separate copyrights.
The true distinction between "equitable title" and "legal title" as
those terms are used throughout the copyright cases is often diffi-
cult to ascertain. In the case of Standard Oil Co. v. Clark,38 Judge
Clark stated that such labels were but "group symbols, denoting a.
bundle of rights or other legal relations" which become of importance
to us only "when we advance beyond these forms to the question
30. 138 U. S. 252, 255 (1890).
31. Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 466 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
32. Ford v. Blaney Amusement Co., 148 F. 642 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906).
33. As far as coverage of Section One of the Copyright Act is concerned,
motion pictures are "dramatic works" within the meaning of paragraph (d)
of that section. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F. 2d
354, 359 (1947).
34. Interstate Hotel Corp. v. Remick Music Corp., 157 F. 2d 744 (C. C. A.
8th 1946).
35. Murphy v. Warner Bros., 112 F. 2d 746, 748 (1940). See also, Buck v.
Swanson, 33 F. Supp. 377, 387 (1939), rez'sd on other grounds, Marsh v.
Buck, 313 U. S. 406 (1941). "The right of an author in his intellectual pro-
duction is . . . assignable and it may be sold and transferred in its entirety,
or a limited interest therein, less than the whole property, may be sold and
assigned, and the various rights included in the entire ownership may be split
up and assigned to different persons."
36. 213 F. 374 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
37. 37 STAT. 488 (1912).
38. 163 F. 2d 917, 930 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 873 (1948).
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of degree, or of number and value of such rights". When viewed
from this standpoint it seems that the exclusive rights which go
together to make up the "bundle" set out in Section One of the
Copyright Act may conceivably be "substantial enough to be re-
garded as some form of property interest"., 9 If this were true,
it would not strain ones imagination to say that each right could be
treated as a capital asset and the sale of any one of them treated,
for tax purposes, as a capital gains transaction.
It is worthy of note that in other related fields, such as trade-
marks, an agreement for the transfer of a limited right in a mark
has been construed as more than a mere license and given the effect
of an assignment conveying "property rights in and to a business,
good will, and trademark". 40
When the question of copyright divisibility first appeared before
the Treasury it decided, oddly enough, that the owner could part
with an interest less than the whole and still have the transaction
dominated a sale.4 1 The situation involved the sale by an author
of the movie rights to his play and the taxing authorities at that
time held, that such disposition fell within the category of the sale
of a capital asset. Such ruling did not stand for long, however, for
as we have already seen, it was soon after decided that where the
author conveyed anything less than the copyright in its entirety he
had done no more than grant a license to the transferee and in the
absence of an outright sale the proceeds should be treated as ordi-
nary income and not capital gains. 42 Since that time the Treasury
has consistently applied the theory of indivisibility of copyright and
has been, in the majority of cases, successful.
The two principal cases relied on by the courts in support of the
rule holding that a grant of a single right under a copyright is a
license are Sabatini v. Comvnissioner,43 and Rhonzer v. Commission-
er.44 Both cases were concerned with nonresident aliens but the
reasoning as regards copyright divisibility has been applied in numer-
ous cases involving resident authors.
In the Sabatini case the income received by the taxpayer and
claimed taxable by the Commissioner arose from certain contracts
39. Ibid.
40. The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 816 (1920).
41. I. T. 2169, IV-1 CutN. BULL. 13 (1925). This ruling was made under
§ 208 (a) (8) of the Revenue Act of 1924, which did not differ materially
from INT. REV. CODE, § 117. See also 0. D. 988, 5 Cum. BuLL. 117 (1921).
42. I. T. 2735, XII-2, Cuai. BULL. 131, 135 (1933). The decision applied the
Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924, 1926 and 1928 to a nonresident alien author who
had granted motion picture rights in his work to an American producer.
43. 98 F. 2d 753 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
44. 153 F. 2d 61 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
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for the publication or dramatization of his works together with his
authorization of their use in motion pictures. All contracts were
negotiated in the United States but approved and executed in Lon-
don. The author was to be paid a stated percentage of the pub-
lisher's retail trade list price, or an otherwise stated amount, for
each volume sold. Payments were to be made to the author's repre-
sentatives in the United States.
When the case came before the Tax Board it was held that the
income derived from the sale was not taxable. Later, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the grounds
that the contract was indivisible and could not be split up and par-
tially assigned, and that the right granted was merely a license to
use the literary property. The Court there stated:
We cannot agree that what occurred was a sale. It was in-
stead but a granting of the right to produce motion pictures
from the works for a limited time. The author remained the
owner of his works and merely licensed their use for a particular
object for a period. There was no transfer of title necessary
to a completed sale.
A similar result was reached in the Rhomer case.45 The taxpayer
there had transferred serial rights in certain of his books to maga-
zine publishers for publication in the United States and Canada.
The Court, in rejecting the petitioner's contention that the amount
received from the sale of an interest in the copyright represented
the purchase price on a sale of property, stated:
Where a copyright owner transfers to any particular trans-
feree substantially less than the entire "bundle of rights" con-
ferred by the copyright, then payment therefor, whether in one
lump sum or in several payments, constitutes royalties within
the meaning of Section 211 (a) (1) (A). For such a transfer
is the grant of a license. (Authorities cited.)
The latest case in the series is Wodehouse v. Commissioner,46 de-
cided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and
holding that the decisions of the Sabatini and Rhomer cases did not
preclude the sale of a right in the copyright less than the whole.
The authorities in the Rhoiner case were referred to but held to
be inapplicable on the ground that they did not show that there
was anything inherent in the nature of a copyright which rendered
45. Rhomer v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 61 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
46. 166 F. 2d 986 (C. C. A. 4th 1948).
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impossible the separate sale of the separable parts. When the ques-
tion reached the Supreme Court 47 there was an excellent opportunity
for the matter to be finally determined, but unfortunately, the de-
cision was reversed on other grounds.48 Hence, the author remains
with his dilemma, that is to say, should he sell his rights in individual
packages and realize a more substantial overall gain but risk the
chance of losing capital gains, or dispose of his literary property,
once and for all, and hope that this will satisfy the requirements of
Section 117.
3. Capital Asset
If the author is fortunate enough to convince the Treasury that
the disposition he has made of his literary property qualifies as an
assignment and not a license he has completed only the first step
which must be taken to show that he is entitled to return his pro-
fits on the basis of capital gains. There remains the question of
whether or not the thing with which he has parted can qualify as a
capital asset.
The term "capital asset" has been defined in Section 117 (a) (1)
of the Internal Revenue Code as any "property held by the tax-
payer (whether or not connected with his trade or business)," with
certain exceptions which are thereafter listed in the same section.
Among these exceptions are found "stock in trade" of the kind which
is ordinarily included in the inventory of the taxpayer, and property
held primarily for sale to "customers" in the ordinary course of the
taxpayer's "trade or business". These two exclusions stand as the
main obstacles in the way of the author being able to return his
profits as capital gains from the sale of a capital asset. Of the two,
primary concern is to be given to the latter, since it is on the basis
of the professional author being in the business of exploiting his
interest in his literary property that the Bureau of Internal Revenue
generally taxes the gain as ordinary income.
Not so long ago, General Eisenhower decided to record his memoirs
for publication, which everybne knew would be near the top of the
best-seller list. It is doubtful if anyone prior to that time had ever
thought of General Eisenhower as an author, and even if he had
occasionally submitted articles for publication it could hardly be con-
tended that he was to any extent engaged in the profession of writ-
ing. Nevertheless, there was a possibility that the Treasury might
attempt to exclude the memoirs from the definition of a capital
47. 337 U. S. 369 (1948).
48. Statutory construction of the phrase "annual or periodical". INT. RXv.
CoM § 143 (b) (1939).
10
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asset on the grounds that their production and sale constituted a
business undertaken by the author. This may seem a bit absurd
to one who has followed the military career of Eisenhower and
thinks of himself principally as the Commander of the Allied Forces
in Europe during World War II, but a review of the decisions in-
volving similar situations will reveal that the absurdity is not so
apparent to the taxing authorities. As it so happened, Eisenhower
successfully established the fact that he had no intention of becom-
ing an author or making any part of his livelihood from the sale of
literary property and was, therefore, allowed to report his profits
as gains from the sale of a capital asset. The majority of those who
seek to have the same privilege accorded them are not so fortunate.
Neither the Code nor the Regulations attempt to define what is
meant by the phrase "trade or business". Construed liberally it may
be said to include everything about which a person may be employed.49
In the case of Von Baumbach v. Sargeant Land Co., the court
adopted with approval the definition which included within the com-
prehensive term "business," "that which occupies the time, attention,
and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit".50 It is
generally conceded that in most cases the question requires an ex-
amination into the facts.5
1
It has been stated that whether a taxpayer is engaged in carrying
on a "trade or business" depends upon the "frequency and continui-
ty" of the transactions in which he engages.52 The decision of Judge
Learned Hand in the Goldsmith case53 illustrates the small degree
of such frequency which is necessary. There, the taxpayer had writ-
ten only one play and had assigned the exclusive motion picture
rights in it to a film company. This limited action, according to
judge Hand, was sufficient to find that the taxpayer was in business
as a, playright; that both the copyright and the literary property
involved were property held primarily for sale to customers; and,
that the profit derived therefrom was ordinary income.
The fact that a person can prove that his principal vocation was
something other than writing is of slight help to him for there seems
to be no longer any doubt that a person may engage in both a pro-
fession and a business simultaneously. In a case involving a lawyer,
who was actively engaged in the practice of law, it was held that
he was also in the business of operating a six-story building which
49. BLACs'S LAW DIcTIONARY, citing People ex rel. Hoyt v. Tax Commis-
sioners, 23 N. Y. 242, 244.
50. 1 Bouvmr's LAw DIcTIoNARY, p. 273.
51. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 212 (1940).
52. Commissioner v. Boeling, 106 F. 2d 305 (C. C. A. 9th 1939).
53. Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 466 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
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he held under a 99 year lease.5 4  Similarly, a taxpayer who sub-
divided a parcel of real estate into lots and sold them through agents
was held to be a dealer in real property though he was engaged in
a number of other unrelated endeavors.55
Quite often a person may be engaged in an undertaking which is,
to him, nothing more than a hobby which he uses to occupy his spare
time. The fact that he derives pleasure or recreation from this
hobby, however, does not mean it is excluded from being defined as
a business. The courts have held that whether the undertaking was
carried on for pleasure or for business is a matter of intent,56 and
that such intent is to be gleaned from all the facts and the normal
and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
57
It is surprising to note that in a field so related as patents the
cases seem to have gone the other way. The same rules are appli-
cable to both patent and copyright holders, in so far as capital gains
are concerned, and yet the courts have been much more lenient in
favor of the former. In a case where the petitioner, at the time
he sold his sole invention, was engaged in engineering and sales
promotion work by others at a salary, it was held that the invention
was not property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of his business, and the sale of the
invention was the sale of a capital asset.5 8 In a similar situation,
a taxpayer had made several inventions in different fields, but had
sold only two of them. He derived his gain from giving licenses on
the patents he had received. It was there found that the inventions
were not stock in trade and were not property of a kind to be in-
cluded in inventory and the taxpayer was allowed to report the profit
as capital gain.59 It is true that there is a difference between a
copyright and a patent, but for the purposes of taxation it is difficult
to see why the courts would apply a single section of the Code"
0
with more strictness in the case of one than in the other.
4. Holding Period
The word "copyright" and the phrase "literary property" are some-
times confounded and used as if they were synonymous, but this
is an error which is of particular importance when it is necessary
to determine accurately the period for which such property has been
54. Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F. 2d 509 (C. C. A. 6th 1943).
55. Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F. 2d 891 (C. C. A. 5th 1938).
56. Edwin S. George, 22 B. T. A. 189, 195 (1931).
57. Charles E. Mitchell, 32 B. T. A. 1093, 1129 (1935).
58. Edward C. Myers, 6 T. C. 258 (1946).
59. Lester P. Barlow, T. C. Memo., Op. Dkt. 111717 (May 19, 1943).
60. INT. Rxv. CoDe , § 117.
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held. The latter term has a more general signification 61 and may
be described as the natural common-law right which a person has
in the form of written expression to which he has, by labor and skill,
reduced his thoughts.62  This right entitled the author and his as-
signs to all the use and profit of his composition, to which no inde-
pendent right is, through any act or omission on his part, vested in
another.63 While such literary property may exist independently
of any statute, it is authoritatively settled in the United States that
there is no "copyright" except that which is both created and secured
by an Act of Congress. Literary property exists from the moment
the author puts his thoughts on paper, but the copyright does not
come into existence until some later time. Bearing this thought in
mind, the question of holding period is somewhat simplified.
Because of the scarcity of cases dealing with this question and
its effect on the disposition of a copyright or literary property we
are forced to look- to the rulings which have been applied in the
closely related field of patents. In the case of Samuel L. Deischer,
64
where the holding period of a patentable invention was questioned,
the Board held that an inventor's property right in his invention
did not come into being upon his obtaining a patent, but existed
from the time he reduced the original invention to actual practice.
In so holding, the court stated:
We think . . . that petitioner had a property right in each of
the inventions which they had reduced to practice. These rights
represented something of exchangeable value which the partner-
ship possessed since is was able to exchange them for a valuable
consideration. (citing cases). That answers the only question
presented here. So we conclude that these particular patents
and inventions perfected and demonstrated more than 2 years
prior to September 28, 1932 (the date on which they were sold),
constituted property owned by the petitioners for more than 2
years.
Applying this same reasoning to literary compositions, the time
when the holding period began would date back to the time it was
reduced to writing and not the date on which the copyright was ob-
tained. This would be true at least where the author parts with
his entire interest at one time. But, suppose he sold only one of
61. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY, p. 46 (1944). See
also Keene v. Wheatley, 14 Fed. Cas. 192 (1819).
62. DRONZ, COPYRIGHT 97 (1st ed. 1879); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Prac.
(N. Y.) 49.
63. See Keene v. Wheatley, 14 Fed. Cas. 192 (1819).
64. 36 B. T. A. 732 (1937).
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the rights or any part less than the whole? Could it not be argued
that the specific privilege granted, e. g., the right to publish or the
right to dramatize, came into existence only upon the issuance of
the copyright, and that the holding period should extend no further
back than that date. The courts have not yet given any clear indi-
cation as to just how they would hold with regard to the separate
rights of a copyright and until such time as they do we can only
speculate.
5. Basis
Determination of basis is of vital importance to the taxpayer,
whether or not he is allowed to take advantage of the capital gains
provisions, since it is only by means of such determination that a
computation can be made of the amount of recognized gain or loss
realized upon the disposition of his property. The basis to be used
ordinarily depends upon the manner by which the taxpayer acquired
the property.6 5 In the case of copyrights the gain or loss is the
difference between selling price and the cost or other basis, with pro-
per adjustments. 6 Where the copyright was acquired by purchase,
its cost is equal to the purchase price; if it was acquired directly
from the government, its cost consists of the various governmental
fees, costs of required materials and development expenses, but does
not include the value of the author's own time.
6 7
A brief but adequate survey of the rules pertaining to copyright
basis is found in the 1948 edition of the Bureau pamphlet, "Your
Income Tax", which states:
Two types of capital expenditures are met in the publication
and sale of copyrighted books:
(a) The cost of producing and copyrighting the text is the
cost of a capital asset or property that is subject to depreciation,
the life of the copyright being 28 years. Because of the monopo-
ly secured under the copyright, the owner has an increased
value for an edition of his book published during the period of
the copyright. The cost of this capital asset may be returned
to the owner thru an annual allowance for depreciation or, if
the coypright is sold, its adjusted basis may be deducted from
the sum received in determining gain or loss from the sale.
(b) Where an author, who publishes a text in book form,
pays all publication costs and sells the book himself, he may
65. INT. REv. COD4, § 113.
66. INT. RMv. CODE, § 113; I. T. RE(., § 29.22 (a) -9.
67. 0. D. 966, 5 Cuzs. BULL. 155 (1921).
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not be able to recover the cost by the depreciation method. Such
capital is the part of the cost of the books that are for sale in
the ordinary course of business and should be recovered when
the book is sold, regardless of the terms of the copyright. Ac-
cordingly, a proportionate part of this cost should be allocated
to each book in the edition and deducted from the selling price
of each book in determining the amount to be reported by the
author as profit.
III. NOMMSIDNT ALImN AUTHORS
1. Jurisdiction
The power of the federal government to tax the income of indi-
viduals is predicated upon a relationship between the individual and
the United States in at least one of the following senses: (1) citi-
zenship,68 (2) residence,6 9 or (3) source of income.7 0 In the case
of a nonresident alien the very nature of the taxpayer's situation re-
quires that jurisdiction be based in the last named basis, i. e. and in
rem authority to tax incomes which have their source in the United
States.
71
From the date of the Sixteenth Amendment and the inception of
the Revenue Act of 1913, a tax has been levied against the gross
income of nonresident aliens which was derived from sources within
the United States.72 Prior to 1936, only a part of this gross income
was subject to the withholding tax,73 and as a result considerable
difficulty was encountered in attempting to tax the remainder of
the income which was not subject to withholding.7 4 Experience
had proved that it was impracticable to enforce a tax on all kinds of
income, for many earnings, such as those from capital gains, were
easily concealed by persons having neither citizenship, residence, nor
place of business in this country3 5 To relieve this administrative
68. Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47, (1924). See also, HARDING, DOUBLE TAXA-
'TION OV PROPERTY AND INCOME (1933) at page 229; Keesling, The Itnportance
of Citizenship, Residence and Domicile in Federal Taxation (1943) 31 CAL.
L. Rxv. 283, 286.
69. Bowring v. Bowers, 24 E. 2d 918 (C. C. A. 2d 1928), Cert. denied, 277
U. S. 608 (1928).
70. Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F. 2d 753 (C. C. A. 2d 1938). Cf. Com-
missioner v. Piedras Negras Broadcasting Co., 127 F. 2d 260 (C. C. A. 5th
1942); 55 HAR. L. Rrv. 1388.
71. See note 70, supra.
72. Revenue Act of 1913, § II A (1), 38 STAT. 166 (1913).
73. That income which was subject to withholding included wages, rent, in-
terest, salaries and other fixed or determinable income, but excepted dividends.
38 STAT. 166 (1913).
74. SrN. Rg,. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1936); H. .. R'. No.
2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1936).
75. See Angell, The Nonresident Alien: A Problem in Federal Taxation of
Income (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 908.
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difficulty, an amendment was made to the Revenue Act of 193676
which excluded from taxable income of all gains realized by non-
resident aliens from the sale of personal property located in 'the
United States, these gains having, heretofore, been treated as taxable
income. The policy was that of restricting the scope of the non-
resident alien's tax to items of ready collectibility, while maintaining
the same flow of Revenue by an increase in rates.77 The amendment,
which is still in force,'limits the taxable income of the nonresident
alien to ". .. fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits
and income ... .-78
Accordingly, Section 211 of the Internal Revenue Code now im-
poses upon nonresident aliens, not engaged in trade or business within
the United States, a tax - subject to withholding at the source of
income 79 - which is measured solely by "the amount received .I .
as interest ... dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities,
compensation, remuneration, emoluments, or other fixed or deter-
minable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income . . ."80
Therefore it is evident that whether the income of a nonresident
alien without a trade or business in this country will be subject to
taxation depends upon the answer to two questions: is it (1) from
a source within the United States, and (2) within the classification
of "annual and periodical"?
76. Revenue Act of 1936, § 211-219, 49 STAT. 1648, 1714-6 (1936).
77. Ibid.
78, INT. Riv. CoDE, § 211 (a) (1) (A), 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 211 (a) (1)
(A) (1945).
79. INT. REv. CODg, § 143 (b) (1939) states: "All persons in whatever ca-
pacity acting . . . having the control, receipt, custody, disposal or payment
of ... fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income
(but only to the extent that any of the above items constitute gross income
from sources within the United States), of a nonresident individual .. . shall
• .. deduct and withhold from such annual or periodical gains, profits, and
income a tax equal to 30 percentum thereof ...."
80. INT. Riv. CODE, § 211 (a) (1) (A) (1939). Section 211 divides non-
resident aliens into three groups: (1) Those "not engaged in trade or busi-
ness in the United States" deriving' $15,400 or less from United States sources
as described in 211 (a) ; (2) those "engaged in trade or business within the
United States; (3) those not engaged in trade or business within the United
States whose gross income from United States sources as described in Section
211 (a) is more than $15,400.
Member of classes (1) and (3), supra, are the subjects of this discussion.
Their taxable income is described in Treasury Reg. 29.212-1(a) thus: "The
gross income of a nonresident alien individual not engaged in trade or busi-
ness within the United States at any time during the taxable year, whether such
alien comes within Sec. 211 (a) (aggregate amount less than $15,400) or 211 (c)
(aggregate amount more than $15,400), is gross income from sources within
the United States consisting of fixed or determinable annual or periodical in-
come."
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2. Who is a Nonresident Alien?
Questions of residence and domicile have caused legal difficulties
for many years in many connections and the same complexities be-
set the determination of who is, for United States tax purposes, a
nonresident alien. The best possible definition is found in the fol-
lowing regulation.8 1
"A 'nonresident alien individual' means an individual -
(a) Whose residence is not within the United States; and
(b) Who is not a citizen of the United States.
"The term includes a nonresident alien fiduciary.
"An alien actually present in the United States who is not a
mere transient or sojourner is a resident of the United States
for purposes 'of the income tax. Whether he is a transient is
determined by his intentions with regard to the length and na-
ture of his stay. A mere floating intention, indefinite as to time,
to return to another country is not sufficient to constitute him a
transient. If he lives in the United States and has no definite
intention as to his stay, he is a resident. One who comes to
the United States for a definite purpose which in its nature may
be promptly accomplished is a transient; but if his purpose is of
such a nature that an extended stay may be necessary for its
accomplishment, and to that end the alien makes his home tem-
porarily in the United States, he becomes a resident, though it
may be his intention at all times to return to his domicile abroad
when the purpose for which he came has been consumated or
abandoned. An alien whose stay in the United States is limited
to a definite period by the immigration laws is not a resident of
the United States within the meaning of this section, in the ab-
sence of exceptional circumstances."
Thus, when a citizen of Hungary, an author by profession, had
come to the United States in 1940 on a roundtrip steamship ticket
and from time to time had his temporary visitor's visa extended, it
was held that he was a nonresident alien because his stay in the
United States was limited to a definite period by his own intention.
82
The Commissioner contended unsuccessfully that there were "ex-
ception1 circumstances" which removed the immunity that the Regu-
lations offered.
The length of time spent in this country is in some instances con-
trolling. If an alien has been residing in the United States for one
81. I. T. RrG., § 29211-2.
82. 14 T. C. Memo 1057, Dkt. 45,317.
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year there is a presumption that he is a resident for tax purposes,
in the absence of any known facts to the contrary. The presumption,
however, may be rebutted by evidence. 83 Intention as to the ex-
pected length of time will not be considered where the residence has
been for a good number of years, though the individual may have
fully expected to return to his native country at any time.
84
Residence, although used as the equivalent of domicile in connec-
tion with probate matters, succession taxes, and inheritance taxes,
as well as the estate tax law, is not necessarily the same as domicile
for federal income tax purposes. The Bureau in all its rulings has
construed residence as something which may be less than domicile. 85
3. Sources Within the United States
When the problem of defining the term "source" was first brought
before the Board of Tax Appeals it resorted, with reluctance, to the
following definition found in Webster's dictionary: ".. . First cause;
origin; that which gives rise to anything; the first producer; one who
or that which originates .... ,8 The use of this definition makes
it apparent that the term conveys one essential idea -that of origin.
Much confusion will be avoided by regarding the term as an activity
or property rather than a place. 87 In this light it has a situs or lo-
cation and if that situs or location is within the United States, the
resulting income is taxable to nonresident aliens.
Hence, if any income is to be taxed to an alien author he must
either have a domicile within the United States or the property or
activities out of which the income issues or is derived must be situ-
ated within the jurisdiction so that the source of the income may be
said to have its situs in this country. The basic rule in the considera-
tion of taxation is some protection offered to life or property,8 8 the
theory being that the income which should be levied upon to help
defray the expenses of government is that which is created by activities
and property protected by this government.
4. Fixed and Determinable Annual and Periodical
The Revenue Act of 1936 amended Section 211 (a) (the section
83. 0. D. 197, 1 Cum. BULL. 164.
84. Bowering v. Bowers, 24 F. 2d 918 (C. C. A. 2d 1928) cert. denied, 277
U. S. 608 (1927).
85. Id. cit. 923.
86. Standard Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., 4 B. T. A. 853, 861 (1926).
87. If the income is from labor, the place where the labor is done should be
decisive; if the income is from capital, the place where the capital is employed
should be decisive; and, if the income is from the sale of capital assets, the
place where the sale is made should be likewise decisive. See Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U. S. 189 (1919).
88. Union Refrigeration Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
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dealing with nonresident aliens) materially in its description of the
taxable income of nonresident alien individuals. These amendments
limited the taxability of the income of each nonresident alien indi-
vidual to those kinds of income to which the withholding provisions
also applied. Therefore, after the 1936 amendment it became clear
;that only income on which a tax had been previously withheld at the
source was to be included in "gross income from sources within the
United States".8 9 The withholding provisions, as they were in 1936
and are today, provide that, when the income paid to nonresident
aliens from sources within the United States consists of "interest,
dividends, rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations,
remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or
periodical gains, profits, and income" (emphasis added) a withhold-
ing at the specified rates is necessary. To be subject to this with-
holding, however, the income must be both "fixed and determinable"
and "annual and periodical". These terms have been defined by the
regulations90 as follows:
Income is fixed when it is to be paid in amounts definitely
predetermined. Income is determinable whenever there is a
basis of calculation by which the amount to be paid may be as-
certained. The income need not be paid annually if it is paid
periodically; that is to say, from time to time, whether or not at
regular intervals. That the length of time during which the
payments are to be made may be increased or diminished in
accordance with someone's will or with the happening of an
event does not make the payments any the less determinable or
periodical. A salesman working by the month for a commission
on sale which is paid or credited monthly receives determinable
periodical income. The share of the fixed or determinable an-
nual or periodical income of an estate or trust from sources
within the United States which is distributable, whether distri-
buted or not, or which has been paid or credited during the tax-
able year to a nonresident alien beneficiary of such estate or trust
constitutes fixed or determinable annual or periodical income
within the meaning of Section 143 (b). The income derived
from the sale in the United States property, whether real or
personal, is not fixed or determinable annual or periodical in-
come. Such items as taxes, interest on mortgages, or premiums
on insurance paid or to or for the account of a nonresident alien
89. Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U. S. 369 (1949).
90. I. T. REG., § 29.143-2.
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landlord by a tenant, pursuant to the terms of the lease, consti-
tute fixed or determinable annual or periodical income.
Once it has been determined that the income of a nonresident alien
would have been required to be included in his gross income from
United States sources had it been received in annual payment, the
payment of those same sums in single lump sums as payments in full
in advance will not, solely by reason of the consolidation of the pay-
ment into one sum, render it tax exempt.9 1
5. Sale vs. Royalties
The gains derived from the sale in the United States of any pro-
perty, whether real or personal, are not income of such a nature as
to fall within the taxing statutes applicable to nonresident aliens
who have no trade or business in this country. Such gain is con-
sidered neither fixed and determinable nor annual and periodical, and
for that reason it is excluded from the definition of "gross income
from sources within the United States", The Commissioner, how-
ever, has stated that activities such as the buying and selling of real
or personal property, on the alien's own behalf or on the behalf of
others, ordinarily constitutes engaging in a trade or business.
92
Royalties, on the other hand, have been explicitly included within
the definition of income from sources within the United States.93
They are generally considered fixed and determinable from the na-
ture of the transaction and annual or periodical from the nature of
their payment. A great deal more trouble has been encountered
with respect to taxation of royalties than has been with the similar
subject, rent. This is readily understandable because subjects or
rental betray their physical location and source of income, but in the
case of royalties we have the old problem of pegging the situs of
an intangible.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has taken the position that royal-
ties paid to a nonresident alien author on the sale of a right or rights
under a copyright "for the use or privilege of using" them in the
United States are taxable.94 No answer, however, can be glibly
given to the question without consideration of the exact contractual
relationship between the author and his American publisher, which
may be one of employment involving the rendering of services abroad,
or one involving the sale of personal property, either abroad or in
this country.
91. Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U. S. 369 (1949).
92. Mini. 5883, Cum. BuLL. p. 244 (1945).
93. INT. Rmv. CoDZ, § 119 (C) (4).
94. Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F. 2d 753 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
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6. Sabatini, Rhomer, and Wodehouse
There are three principal cases which have dealt with the subject
of taxation of income from the disposal of literary property within
the United States by nonresident alien authors. Though the law
has changed from time to time since the first of these cases was de-
cided, the courts still manage to find some basis for holding the for-
eign author liable for profits derived from United States sources.
The reasoning in these cases has not been entirely uniform and it
can not be said that each court, in succession, has adopted the hold-
ing of the former. There is, however, one basic theme which seems
to run throughout them, the thought that Congress surely could not
have intended to allow such a ready source of revenue to go un-
tapped. To predicate a decision upon the premise that to decide
otherwise would work a disadvantage to the needs of the Treasury
hardly seems justifiable and yet one of the cases mentions this point
specifically9 5 and from the somewhat specious reasoning of the other
two, it is apparent that a similar thought must have had a measure
of influence.
The first in the series is Sabatini v. Commissioner,96 decided in
1938. Sabatini was a nonresident alien author residing in London,
England, having never been personally within the United States.
The income received by him and claimed taxable by the Commissioner
arose from the sale to United States publishers of volume and second
serial rights to certain books he had written. These books were of
two kinds: (1) those on which'a United States copyright could be
obtained; and (2) those under which no copyright could be obtained.
As to the first class, exclusive rights were granted and, as to the
second class, the author agreed to let no one else have the right to
publish as long as the grantee was publishing. All contracts were
negotiated in the United States but approved and executed in London.
The consideration for these rights was paid in one lump sum instead
of in a. series of payments.
The contract having been made in England, the Board treated it
as a sale of property there and held the income from the sale not
taxable. When the case reached the Circuit Court of Appeals it re-
jected the idea, of a sale and based its decision on Sections 119 and
212 of the Revenue Act of 1928 which provided for defining "in-
come from United States sources" and taxation of nonresident aliens,
respectively. The sole question was, did the income received fall
within the meaning of these two statutes?
95. Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U. S. 369 (1949).
96. 98 F. 2d 753 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
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The Circuit ,Court of Appeals held that it did. In so holding it
found that the transaction in dispute amounted to nothing more than
the granting of a license to produce motion pictures from the works
for a period. The author, it went on to say, remained the owner of
the literary property and there was no transfer of title necessary
to a completed sale. Upon the basis of this conclusion the payments
were found to be ". . . royalties for the use of or for the privilege
of using in the United States . .. copyrights, . . . and other like
property", and, consequently, were payments within the terms of
Section 119.
The contention was made on behalf of the taxpayer that the very
nature of the payments, i. e., the fact that they had been made in
one lump sum rather than installments, was evidence that their true
character could not be within the meaning of the term "royalties".
The court refused, however, to accept this contention and stated that
the lump sum payment was merely a method of paying in advance
for something which was ordinarily paid for over a period of years.
It was admitted that there was no direct authority for the view taken,
but it was believed to be correct in principle and in accord with legis-
lative intent.
Here again, the author is being plagued with the notion that the
copyright is an indivisible thing which can not be split up and par-
tially assigned. Were it otherwise there would be slight justification
for the treatment accorded the taxpayer in the above case.
The second case in the series is Rhomer v. Cammissioner,97 de-
cided in 1946. The facts in this case are almost identical with those
of the Sabatini case. The author was a nonresident alien who had
parted with less than his entire "bundle of rights" to a publishing
company in the United States. The payments were made in one
lump sum and the same argument was made that they constituted
the proceeds of a sale and were not royalties. The court, after dis-
cussing the indivisibility of copyright doctrines, stated:
Payment for the grant of such a license is measured by re-
ference to the future use or expected use of the license by the
licensee, and is often payable in installments; but it is no less
royalty paid for such use when disbursed in a single amount
... It is like interest paid for several years in one sum or rent
paid in advance for the use of a building for a period of years;
as such a payment of interest or rent surely would come within
the . . . (meaning of the taxing provisions), so we hold, does
the payment here. (Authorities cited.)
97. 153 F. 2d 61 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
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It was further contended, on behalf of the taxpayer, that the
section as to the extent of tax liability before the court in the Sabatini
case did not contain the phrase found in Section 211 with the words
"'annual and periodical". It was argued, therefore, that even if
royalties are covered by Section 211 they must be royalties which
have the characteristic of being paid as "annual" or "periodical"
income. In rejecting that argument the court again referred to legis-
lative intent, and stated:
We think that . . . Congress intended the words 'other fixed
and determinable' to include therein a lump sum paid for the
use of a copyright in the United States. Such a payment for a
license is both 'fixed' and easily 'determinable', and it is not
at all 'impossible to effectively collect' a tax thereon. According-
ly, we think that Congress did not intend to exclude such a
tax ....
In concluding its remarks the court confessed that the Congression-
al intent was not crystal dear, but it felt that since Congress had
"avowedly sought 'substantial amounts ... of revenue' from taxation
of nonresident aliens and aimed primarily to replace 'a theoretical
system impractical of administration' " it could not have intended to
exclude such a tax.
The third and latest case in this series is Wodehouse v. Cominis-
sioner,98 involving the taxability of royalties from the sale of several
stories by P. G. Wodehouse, a nonresident alien author not doing
business in the United States. Wodehouse, in the years 1938-1941,
sold several unpublished stories to the Curtis Publishing Company,
publishers of The Saturday Evening Post, for a lump-sum considera-
tion. The contract of sale in each of the transactions provided that
copyright on the contents of the magazine would be taken out in
the name of the publisher, 99 but that on demand after publication
on such copyright would be assigned to the author, except American
(including Canadian and South American) serial rights, which were
reserved to the publisher.
The Commissioner, contending that the purchase price in each in-
stance was taxable as royalties at rates applicable to nonresident
98. 166 F. 2d 986 (C. C. A. 4th 1948).
99. Pusuant to Section 3 of the Copyright Act, copyright taken out on the
contents of a periodical protects "all the component parts". 35 STAT. 1076
(1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 3. (The Copyright Act was re-enacted by Congress
on July 30, 1947, Chapter 391 (Section 1), 61 STAT. 652, with minor changes
such as the renumbering of sections, and modified as Title 17 U. S. C.). As
to the effect of a subsequent assignment of the copyright, see Kaplan v. Fox
Film Corporation, 19 F. Supp. 780 (D. C. N. Y. 1937).
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aliens not doing business in the United States, was upheld in this con-
tention by the Tax Court,100 but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Judge Dobie dissenting, reversed. The majority opinion
discussed the theory of indivisibility of copyright but found that it
was, at most, only concerned with rules of procedure. As in the
other cases, considerable reliance was placed on legislative intent,
but in reaching a different result from the two previous cases, the
court said "That the will of Congress is frustrated when that which
is generally recognized in the commercial exploitation of literary
works as a sale is subjected to the incidence of tax under a different
name".101
As a result of this conflict of decisions, the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States. The Circuit Court had
rested its decision on two grounds: (1) that the transfer was a sale
and therefore not taxable, and (2) that the lump sum payments did
not answer the description of "annual and periodical gains". Un-
fortunately the Supreme Court, after a review of the Sabatini and
Rhorner cases, chose to base its decision on point (2) rather than
on point (1), and upheld the Commissioner on the basis of statutory
construction.10 2 Had the decision been on the first point there would
have been a final determination of the legal effect of transfers of less
than the entire copyright by the proprietor. As it now stands, how-
ever, the decision provides merely for a device for avoiding taxation.
There have been two recent sequels to the Wodehouse case which
decided points of considerable interest, even where it is conceded
that the nonresident alien is liable under the facts of the original
case. It seems that Wodehouse had assigned an undivided one-half
interest in his story manuscripts to his wife and it was contended that
he was not taxable on the share of royalties received by her. He had
also sent to his agent a copy of the assignment with instructions to
note that the wife would be entitled to half interest. The agent sold
the story and deposited the net royalties to the accounts of the tax-
payer and his wife, half each. The Circuit Court of Appeals for
100. 8 T. C. 637 (1947).
101. 166 F. 2d 986, 990 (C. C. A. 4th 1948). The court also rejected the
construction placed upon the phrase "fixed or determinable annual or periodical
gains" by the Second Circuit, at 991, 992.
102. The reasoning of the Court was that the receipts unquestionably would
have been taxed if received under the Revenue Act of 1934, and that the
changes made by the 1936 Act, and continued in later Acts, were not, according
to their legislative history, intended to exempt income such as here involved.
The Court also observed that one advance payment to cover the entire 28
year period of a copyright comes within the reach and reason of the Revenue
Acts as well as, or even better than, two or more partial payments of the same
sum.
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the Second Circuit found that the assignment was a bona fide gift,
and that, consequently, the taxpayer should be liable for only that
portion of the royalties allocable to his remaining interest.1 03 Exact-
ly one month later, however, when the same parties came before
the Fourth Circuit on substantially similar facts, the Court there
held that the assignment lacked economic reality and should be dis-
regarded for income tax purposes.
104
As if this were not enough to confuse thoroughly the nonresident
alien as to what his ultimate standing would be taxwise, the same
courts in the same opinions decided, first by the Second Circuit that,
a lump sum payment of royalties for both American and Canadian
serial rights to a manuscript was taxable in its entirety as income
from sources within the United States, and one month later by the
Fourth Circuit, that the same nonresident alien on the same facts
was taxable only on that portion of the payment allocable to the
United States.
These two diverse opinions tend to exemplify the current feeling
that victory in a tax case sometimes depends upon your choice of
tribunals. Taxpayers will not know what the effects of similar trans-
actions to those of Mr. Wodehouse will be until the Supreme Court
has had an opportunity to examine the question. In view of the
confusing opinions issued by that Court in recent years, they may
not know the answer even then.
IV. CONCMUSlON.
The results of this research have not led to any satisfactory means
whereby the author can legitimately take advantage of large tax
savings other than those which are open to the ordinary business
or professional man. The principal complaint lies in the fact that,
to date, the taxing authorities have not seen fit to accord to literary
'works any greater significance than that of stock in trade of the
kind ordinarily sold in a trade or business. In the opinion of the
writer, there is sufficient basis for placing literary property in the
category of capital assets by recognizing the fact that the current
"market value" of his present and past written works derives from
a more or less longtime appreciation in his competence, reputation
and popularity. If the author is not to be forced to look for tax relief
through various technical loopholes in the present law, it would cer-
tainly be advisable for him, along with the various organizations of
which he is a member, to make a survey of the current economics in
103. Wodehouse v. Commissioner (U. S. C. A.-2; 11-21-49).
104. Wodehouse v. Commissioner (U. S. C. A.-4; 12-21-49).
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the literary field and the effect which the present system of taxation
plays in this survey and use this as a basis for tax proposals to be pre-
sented to Congress. As the law now stands legislative relief seems
to be the author's only salvation.
Such relief might be brought about by an amendment to Section
117 of the Internal Revenue Code, placing greater emphasis on the
ability-to-pay principle which is supposedly the foundation upon which
the exorbitant rates of federal income taxation are based. This could
conceivably be accomplished by redefining the phrase "trade or busi-
ness" to exclude those engaged in the production of property, the
primary value of which lies in its artistic worth. If it is felt that
any change in the present wording of the capital gains provisions is
to be avoided, then an attempt might be made to have the author's
works included within the scope and purpose of Section 117 (j).105
If the taxing authorities continue to stand pat on their present
ruling with regard to the definition of a capital asset, an attempt
should be made to eliminate the "bundle of rights" theory which has
been a Nemesis to both resident and nonresident authors for so long
now. There is no specific provision in the copyright statute which
forbids an assignment of less than the whole and the rules of statu-
tory construction do not compel the conclusion that less than all can
not be assigned. To the contrary, Section one of the Copyright Act
provides for divisibility, in that, the exclusive right granted by the
statute is not a single right but an aggregate of individual rights
segregated into lettered paragraphs.
As an alternative to either of these proposals an assertion could
be made to the effect that if all individuals standing in relatively com-
parable positions taxwise are not to be accorded the capital gains
privilege, then do away with the provisions of Section 117 alto-
gether. This would place the author on an equal footing with the
investor, the only difference being that we take away a privilege from
the latter rather than give one to the former, and since disparity of
treatment is the principal problem, this might be the most reasonable
solution. Similar steps have been advocated in the past.'0 0
Just recently, two famous radio comedians, Correll and Gosden-
105. INT. Rev. CODg, § 117 (j) provides that, if the gains from transactions
involving property that comes within the meaning of "property used in a trade
or business" exceed the losses and such property has been held for more than
six months, the net gain may be taxable at the maximum alternative rate of
25% applicable to capital gains; on the other hand, if the losses exceed the
gains, such gains and losses are not treated as gains and losses from the sale
or exchange of capital assets.
106. See Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under the
Federal Income Tax, 26 Tex. L. Ray. 440 (1948).
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better known as "Amos n' Andy" - sold their entire radio show to
the Columbia Broadcasting System for the sum of $2,000,000. Very
obviously the owners and performers were not holding the show
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of their trade
or business and the Commissioner allowed them to return the profit
from the transaction as capital gain.107 Immediately, the other radio
artists were demanding to know if their tax consultants had been
asleep at the switch. Within a short time Jack Benny tried a similar
maneuver, but by this time the Commissioner, having seen the pros-
pects of his former holding, had withdrawn within the sanctity of
his prerogative to change his decision. The element of personal ser-
vices, with regard to what is actually transferred in the sale of a
radio show, was undoubtedly the obstacle which stood in the way of
the Commissioner allowing his former ruling to stand. It has been
made clear in a series of cases that the rights of an employee under
an employment contract are not property as far as the capital gain
provisions are concerned. Perhaps it is that same element, i. e.,
a feeling that artistic productions represent personal services rather
than property, that prohibits the author from returning the profits
from his labor as income from the sale of a capital asset.
In 1939, an attempt was made to alleviate the situation of the
author and those in similar positions by the passage of Section 107
of the Internal Revenue Code.'0 8 The purpose of this section was
to limit the amount of taxes which normally would have been pay-
able if the royalty income had been received in equal portions in each
of the years the author devoted to the writing of his work. There
are, however, qualifications as to time and amount which limit the
relief afforded, and even to its fullest extent it does not compare with
the benefit of the capital gain rates.
The outlook for the nonresident alien author is somewhat brighter
107. N. Y. Times, June 2, 1948 p. 31, col. 1 - p. 29, col. 5.
108. "Compensation for Services Rendered for a Period of Thirty-Six Months
or More and Back Pay. - - -
"(a) Personal Services. - If at least 80 per centum of the total compensa-
tion for personal services covering a period of thirty-six calendar months or
more (from the beginning to the completion of such services) is received or
accrued in one taxable year by an individual or a partnership, the tax attri-
butable to any part thereof which is included in the gross income of any indi-
vidual shall not be greater than the aggregate of all the taxes attributable to
such part had it been included in the gross income of such individual ratably
over that part of the period which precedes the date of such receipt or accrual.
"(b) Patent, Copyright, Etc.-For the purpose of this subsection, the term
'artistic work' . . . in the case of an individual, means a literary . . . com-
position of such individual or a . . . copyright covering a literary work of
such individual, the work on which by such individual covered a period of
thirty-six calendar months or more from the beginning to the completion of
such composition . .. ."
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and the decision in the Wodehouse case has been tempered to a great
extent by recent Tax Treaties between the United States and other na-
tions. In 1946, the United States and Great Britain signed a con-
vention for the relief of double taxation. Under the terms of that
convention, royalties are no longer taxable by the United States or
subject to the withholding tax where the author is a resident of
Great Britain and pays taxes there on the same royalties. Great
Britain, in turn, does not tax residents of the United States. Similar
treaties have been negotiated between the United States and Den-
mark, France, Netherlands and Sweden. Others are, at present, in
the drafting stage.
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